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Medicaid payment policies may be the most significant lever available to states to 
contain costs and improve quality.  Effective use of this lever is of paramount 
importance to improve value, address current budget shortfalls, and prepare for 
increased Medicaid enrollment under federal health reform. 
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 ealth care reform holds the promise of near universal 
coverage and Medicaid is the foundation for it, 
eventually covering more than 75 million Americans. 
This brief’s goal is to promote Medicaid’s ability to buy 
value — cost-effective, quality care — in both the acute 
and long-term care sectors. Specifically, it addresses four 
issues: (1) the importance of payment reform in Medicaid; 
(2) the challenges Medicaid faces in implementing 
payment reforms; (3) payment reform opportunities in 
Medicaid; and (4) how federal and state roles might shift 
to create a more dynamic and effective partnership for 
tackling complicated and politically charged payment 
issues. By raising questions about Medicaid’s rate-setting 
policies and their relationship to access, quality, and cost 
containment, we hope to inform and advance discussions 





















We thank the many individuals who contributed to the 
rich discussion on rethinking Medicaid payment 
strategies. In particular, we are grateful for the 
seasoned expertise of Deborah Bachrach, JD, who 
wrote this paper based on her wealth of knowledge on 
Medicaid payment issues as the former New York State 
Medicaid Director. Deborah and I acknowledge the 
editorial contributions of CHCS staff Melanie Bella, Julia 
Berenson, and Lorie Martin. And finally, I wish to 
recognize the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for 
supporting this and future work to bring Medicaid to 
the payment reform table.  
 
Stephen A. Somers, PhD 
Center for Health Care Strategies, Inc. 
Health care reform creates enormous new 
responsibilities and opportunities for Medicaid. The 
scope of those responsibilities – both programmatic 
and financial – make it absolutely incumbent upon its 
leadership at the federal and state levels to get 
Medicaid’s payment systems right.  
To explore options for payment reform, the Center for 
Health Care Strategies (CHCS) worked with the leaders 
of the Center for Medicaid, CHIP, and Survey & 
Certification, to conduct a small group consultation on 
Medicaid payment methodologies and levels in April 
2010. Participants, including federal officials, state 
Medicaid leaders, national payment reform experts, and 
several congressional staff, discussed ways to redesign 
Medicaid payment policies and provided comments on 




Today, over 60 million Americans rely on Medicaid.1 In 
March, the President signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) extending 
coverage to 32 million people through an expansion of 
Medicaid and new subsidies for moderate-income 
individuals; the newly eligible Medicaid population could 
number between 15-20 million.2,3 State Medicaid 
agencies will have an enormous responsibility: to purch
cost-effective, quality care for more than 75 million 
people. Medicaid’s payment policies are its single most 
important tool for advancing these goals. It is widely 
recognized that the current fee-for-service payment model 
incents volume and intensity of services rather than th
value of the services. Providers whose primary concern
keeping people healthy are in effect penalized for not 




stead be  
 2 
rewarded for delivering just the right care, 
at just the right time. 
While there is widespread acceptance of 
the importance of payment reform, 
Medicaid has been largely absent from 
national payment reform discussions, 
which have focused almost entirely on 
Medicare. Already covering significant and 
growing numbers of medically complicated, 
high-cost patients — most of them in the 
unmanaged fee-for-service system — 
Medicaid must find ways to improve 
quality and reduce costs. Reducing 
eligibility levels, eliminating covered 
benefits, and imposing across-the-board 
rate cuts are blunt tools that produce short-
term budget relief. However, these 
strategies may ultimately undermine efforts 
to reform the payment system and improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
nation’s health system. Medicaid payment 
redesign offers an alternative cost 
containment strategy that can also 
improve access to quality care while 
delivering some significant savings 
relatively quickly. Moreover, national 
payment and delivery system reform can 
only succeed if all patient populations are 
accommodated and all significant payers 
participate. In short, Medicaid must be at 
the payment reform table. 
Medicaid payment polices, like eligibility 
polices, are driven by individual states and 
as a result, Medicaid payment 
methodologies and payment levels vary 
considerably. Some states have embraced 
highly sophisticated payment methods, 
while others rely on flawed methodologies 
long abandoned by Medicare and private 
payers. Payment levels likewise vary, with 
many states paying well below Medicare 
rates, and, a few paying above Medicare 
levels. Federal review of state payment 
policies, while often extensive, tends to 
focus on issues of notice and transparency, 
and compliance with federal upper 
payment limit requirements rather than on 
the effectiveness of the payment policy in 
advancing access, quality, or cost 
containment.  
States have led the nation in the effective 
use of managed care arrangements. 
However, while almost two-thirds of 
Medicaid beneficiaries are in some form of 
managed care, including primary care case 
management (PCCM), most spending 
remains in highly variable fee-for-service 
programs in large part due to the carve outs 
from managed care of complicated and 
costly populations and the absence of 
capitation in PCCM programs.  
For ease of exposition, this first CHCS 
brief on payment reform focuses on 
Medicaid payment policies in the acute 
sector. However, the principles are equally 
relevant to a consideration of payment 
policies for nursing homes, home health, 
and home- and community-based services. 
With the increasing emphasis on home 
health, personal care, and other 
alternatives to institutional care for elderly 
and disabled beneficiaries, identification 
and implementation of sound payment and 
delivery models in this sector are both 
timely and essential. Medicaid’s prominent 
role in these markets offers additional 
challenges and opportunities that require 
separate exploration. (See Figure 1 for a 
template to help outline Medicaid 
payment reform strategies.) 
IN BRIEF… 
Effective Medicaid payment reform will need:  
 Sound payment fundamentals that accommodate patient acuity, 
encourage efficiency, collect accurate clinical data, and facilitate 
measurement of quality.   
 Development of payment innovations that support improved models 
of care, including medical homes, bundled payments, and 
accountable care organizations.  
 Alignment with other public and private payers at the state and 
regional/local level.  
 A dynamic partnership with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), including both its Medicaid and Medicare leadership. 
   
Also beyond the scope of this brief are: (1) 
a comprehensive discussion of state 
managed care arrangements, which should 
ultimately be subjected to the same 
questions about value; and, (2) payment 
policies for the dual eligibles that present 
unique challenges and untapped 
opportunities for both Medicare and 
Medicaid. Getting Medicaid payment 
policies right is critical in each of these 
areas; and, each needs to be addressed. 
 
Payment Reform – An Imperative 
for Medicaid 
Payment policies are powerful tools for 
federal and state governments seeking to 
rein in health care spending while 
preserving or improving quality. For states, 
cost containment is an immediate 
imperative. However, states face some 
unique challenges as well as real 
opportunities as they seek to redesign their 
payment systems. 
 
Today, Medicaid represents 70 percent of 
state health expenditures and is the largest 
or second largest item in every state 
budget. Prior to enactment of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) in 2008, states financed 43 
percent of Medicaid costs with the federal 
government assuming 57 percent.7,8 Under 
ARRA, the average state share has 
decreased by 6.3 percentage points.9 
However, even with this temporary 
increase in the Federal Medical Assistance 
Percentage (FMAP), states are currently 
hard pressed to fund their share of 
Medicaid spending as enrollment increases 
significantly and state tax revenues 
plummet.10 When ARRA’s enhanced 
FMAP authorization expires as currently 
planned at the end of 2010 (or at best six 
months later), the situation will only get 
worse. The situation will change again in 
2014, when a national eligibility level of 
133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL) goes into effect and the FMAP 
increases to 100 percent for three years for 
Figure 1: Initial Framework for Outlining Medicaid Payment Reform Strategies 
 
This template provides a framework for applying the principles covered in this brief to help guide initial state planning efforts 
around payment reform strategies for acute, long-term, and managed care. 
 Payment Method Payment Level 
Linking Payment to 
Quality/Outcomes 
ACUTE CARE 
Inpatient4   
Hospital OPD   
Community Clinic5   
Physician Primary Care/Specialty Care   
Ancillaries   
LONG-TERM CARE 
Home Health Care   
Personal Care   
Nursing Home   
MANAGED CARE6 
Medicaid-Only   
Dual Eligibles   
Payment policies are 
powerful tools for 
federal and state 
governments seeking 
to rein in health care 
spending while 
improving quality. 
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most childless adults and some parents and 
again in 2017 when the FMAP for these 
populations begins to phase down to 90 
percent. While it is clear that Medicaid 
enrollment will increase dramatically 
starting in 2014 under PPACA, the impact 
on state budgets is less clear as a result of 
increased FMAP for some existing 
enrollees as well as the potential 
redundancy of state-funded coverage and 
public health programs with increased 
enrollment through Medicaid and state-
based exchanges. 
As a result of the recession and four years 
before implementation of the Medicaid 
expansion, over four million more people 
have enrolled in Medicaid and Medicaid’s 
enrollment growth is the highest in six 
years.11 At the same time, 48 states are 
facing budget shortfalls totaling $194 
billion or 28 percent of state revenues.12 
Constrained by balanced budget 
requirements, states are targeting Medicaid 
spending. As a condition of enhanced 
FMAP, ARRA prohibits states from 
cutting Medicaid eligibility (maintenance 
of effort). PPACA contains a similar 
bar.13,14 States are therefore slashing 
provider reimbursement rates — generally 
with across-the-board cuts — and reducing 
or eliminating covered benefits.15 
Enhanced FMAP certainly helps, but there 
are no easy answers to the countercyclical 
effect of Medicaid. Increasing FMAP does 
not address Medicaid cost growth; it is 
simply a short-term “fix” that does not 
solve the problem. Medicaid desperately 
needs sound strategies — such as payment 
reform — that improve access and quality 
while bringing down costs. Poor cost 
containment choices today will have 
lasting impacts on states’ ability to connect 
millions of new Medicaid enrollees to cost-
effective, quality care starting in 2014.  
Looking beyond cost containment goals, 
Medicaid’s growing role as a purchaser 
enables it to influence delivery models not 
just for Medicaid patients but for all 
patients. Consider that even before the 
enrollment of 16 million more people 
under federal reform, 26 state Medicaid 
programs would be on the Fortune 500 list, 
if they were publicly traded companies. 
Indeed, New York Medicaid would be on 
the Fortune 50, ahead of Pfizer and Aetna. 
Likewise, with respect to some services — 
most notably obstetrics, pediatrics, 
behavioral health, and long-term care — 
Medicaid is increasingly the major payer. 
Unfortunately, payment reform in 
Medicaid is extraordinarily difficult to do. 
Medicaid faces many unique challenges 
emanating from its history in the welfare 
system; its central role in supporting safety 
net providers; a federalist structure that 
divides programmatic, administrative, and 
fiscal responsibility among multiple levels 
of government; and, the 12-month budget 
lens through which state legislative bodies 
evaluate Medicaid rates. The broader 
economic pressures further exacerbate the 
challenge of reforming Medicaid’s payment 
policies.  
Finally, Medicaid payment reform has been 
impeded by a dearth of national 
information on Medicaid payment policies 
and their impact on patient access, quality, 
and outcomes. Far more robust data exists 
with respect to Medicare. In addition, 
since 1997, the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has 
provided independent analyses of Medicare 
payment methodologies and payment 
levels and their relationship to access and 
quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. 
However, Medicaid is catching up. In 
2009, Congress established the Medicaid 
and CHIP Payment and Access 
Commission (MACPAC) to play a similar 
role to MedPAC in providing analyses of 
Medicaid payment policies and spurring 
adoption of sound payment practices. In 
addition, under PPACA, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) is 
charged with collecting standardized 
information from states with respect to 
adult and child quality measures. 
   
Medicaid Payment Policies – The 
Basics 
Any discussion of Medicaid payment 
reform must start with a reassessment and 
potential recalibration of fee-for-service 
payment methodologies and payment 
levels. First, for the foreseeable future, fee-
for-service will remain a primary payment 
option. Second, fee-for-service payment 
algorithms provide the metrics to measure 
outcome improvements and cost savings 
with respect to payment reform initiatives. 
Finally, fee-for-service payment 
methodologies and payment amounts are 
the building blocks for payment 
innovations from medical homes to 
episodic payments to accountable care 
organizations.  
In reconsidering payment fundamentals in 
Medicaid, it is helpful to review the basic 
methodologies that the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
adopted for Medicare. Prior to 1983, 
Medicare paid for inpatient hospital 
services based on each hospital’s reported 
costs plus a profit margin. In 1983, 
Medicare abandoned its cost-based hospital 
reimbursement system and adopted a new 
pricing methodology paying hospitals a 
predetermined amount based on each 
patient’s clinical condition or diagnosis-
related group (DRG). Because payment 
does not turn on institution-specific costs, 
hospitals have incentives to improve 
efficiency; and, because payment is greater 
for sicker patients, hospitals are more 
willing and better able to serve all 
patients.16 The shift to a DRG-pricing 
system was truly transformational and led 
to documented improvements in efficiency 
and patient outcomes.17  
In 2007, Medicare adopted a new and more 
refined DRG system, Medicare Severity-
Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRG), to 
better recognize severity of patient illness 
and more accurately capture the true cost 
of care.18,19 Evidence that the previous 
DRG system, known as CMS-DRGs, 
systematically underpaid hospitals for the 
sickest patients prompted CMS to adopt a 
new algorithm.20 MS-DRGs have resulted 
in an improvement in payment accuracy.21 
However, Medicare’s new inpatient 
payment algorithm, developed based on 
the medical service needs and 
characteristics of its elderly and disabled 
enrollees, does not match well to the needs 
of the Medicaid population.  
By comparison to its role in Medicare, the 
federal government has given states 
significant flexibility in selecting Medicaid 
payment methodologies and payment 
levels.22 However, federal law requires 
states to adopt payment methods and 
payment levels consistent with “efficiency, 
economy, and quality of care” and 
sufficient to assure that Medicaid patients 
have equal access to the care and services 
available to the general population in the 
geographic area.23 
States have selected, and CMS has 
approved, a wide range of inpatient and 
outpatient payment methodologies. Figure 2 
breaks down the different methodologies 
used by states. Briefly, six states use 
hospital-specific costs to set inpatient rates 
and more than 20 states use cost-based 
outpatient rates.24 Nine states pay for 
inpatient care on a per diem basis and 15 
states are using CMS DRGs.  
The wide variation in payment method for 
hospital inpatient services — Medicaid’s 
single largest expenditure — should trigger 
some level of concern for those seeking to 
ensure that Medicaid buys value. For 
inpatient services, cost-based 
reimbursement and per diem 
reimbursement have perverse incentives 
encouraging more care and less efficiency; 
yet, more than a dozen states use one of 
these methods. In addition, more than 20 
states rely on CMS DRGs or MS DRGs, 
both of which were developed for Medicare 
populations and fail to account for the 
disease burden or hospitalization patterns 
of the typical Medicaid population, 
including for example newborn birth 
weights, many pediatric illnesses, high-risk 
pregnancies, HIV, and serious psychiatric 
comorbidities. 
Any discussion of 
Medicaid payment 
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Similarly, for hospital outpatient services, 
states have selected several different 
payment methods with more than 20 states 
using cost-based reimbursement, which 
inherently rewards higher costs. State 
Medicaid agencies that use cost-based 
reimbursement are at the mercy of provider 
decisions about utilization and unit costs. 
More than 15 states use some type of fee 
schedule that likewise perversely 
incentivizes providers to maximize the 
number of services. At least a fee schedule, 
unlike cost-based reimbursement, does not 
reward high-cost providers. Fewer than a 
dozen states use a payment system that 
includes some packaging or bundling of 
services. 
While selecting the right payment 
classification system or methodology is 
critical, equally important is the level of 
payment. There can be little doubt that 
Medicaid has improved access to care for 
low-income patients, however, low 
provider rates continue to plague the 
program, limiting physician participation 
and patient access in some 
communities.25,26,27 In 2008, Medicaid fee-
for-service physician payments nationally 
averaged only 72 percent of the rates paid 
Figure 2: Hospital Inpatient and Outpatient Payment Methodologies by State 
How Medicaid Pays for Hospital Inpatient Care (April 2010) 
Per Stay –  CMS Diagnosis Related Groups (CMS-DRGs):  
CO, IA, IL, KS**, KY, MN, NC**, ND*,  
OH, PA*, SC, UT, VT, WI**, WV** 
 
*Moving to APR-DRGs, **Moving to MS-DRGs  
Per Stay – AP (All-Patient) or Tricare DRGs:  
DC, GA, IN, NE, NJ, VA, WA 
 
Per State –  Medicare Severity DRGs (MS-DRGs):  
MI, NH, NM, OK, OR, SD, TX 
Per Stay – Other:  
DE, MA*, NV, WY 
 
*Casemix adjustment based on APR-DRGs
Per Stay –  All Patient Refined DRGs (APR-DRGs):  
MT, NY, RI 
Per Diem:  
AK, AZ, CA, FL, HI, LA, MO, MS*, TN 
 
*Moving to APR-DRGs
Cost Reimbursement:  
AL, AR, CT, ID, ME 
Other (Regulated Charges):  
MD* 
 
*Casemix adjustment based on APR-DRGs
 
How Medicaid Pays for Hospital Outpatient Care (Draft March 2010) 
Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC) Groups:  
IA, MI, MN, MT, RI, VT, WA, WY 
Ambulatory Patient Groups (APGs):  
MA, MD, NY 
States that base their payment methods on Medicare's approach typically follow 
Medicare in using a fee schedule for lab services, an RBRBS-based fee schedule for 
therapy services, and APCs for all other services. States vary in how closely they follow 
the Medicare APC logic. Some (e.g., MT) very closely follow the Medicare model while 
others (e.g., RI) may not adopt Medicare payment policies such as conditional 
packaging and composite APCs. 
Enhanced APGs are a software product developed and owned by 3M Health 
Information Systems. MA and MD use APGs indirectly to measure hospital casemix in 
setting payment rates. NY calculates payment for each claim based directly on APGs. 
Primarily Other Fee Schedules: 
AL, AR, CA, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY,  
NV, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, TX, WV 
Primarily Cost Reimbursement:  
AK, AZ, CO, CT, DC, DE, FL, LA, NC, ND, NE, NH*,  
NJ, NM**, ME, MO, MS, SD, TN, UT, VA, WI 
 
*Moving to APGs, ** Moving to APCs
This group of states covers a wide range of approaches, with more emphasis on fee 
schedules than on cost reimbursement. Nevertheless, some fee schedule states may use 
cost reimbursement for selected services while cost-reimbursement states typically use 
fee schedules for lab services and sometimes other types of care. Fee-schedule states 
may have developed their own fees or have based their payment methods on other 
approaches, such as Medicare's previous method for ambulatory surgical centers. 
In a typical cost reimbursement method, Medicaid makes an interim payment for each 
claim based on a percentage of billed charges. Final payment is calculated after a cost 
settlement process that typically occurs one to three years after the service is provided. 
Although a state's payment method may be primarily cost reimbursement, states 
typically use fee schedules to pay for lab services and, depending on the state, may also 
use fee schedules for imaging services or other types of care. 
Source:  ACS Government Healthcare Solutions.  
   
by Medicare.28 While there are no 
complete data on payment amounts under 
Medicaid managed care, anecdotal 
information strongly suggests that its 
payments are closer to Medicare levels. As 
a result, Medicaid managed care plans have 
been able to attract physicians unwilling to 
participate in Medicaid fee-for-service. 
CMS, for the most part, has not addressed 
the issue of payment levels beyond its 
requirement that payment rates not exceed 
an upper payment limit tied to Medicare or 
reported costs.29 
While payment levels may not be the only 
determinant of whether a provider 
participates in Medicaid, it is certainly a 
key factor.30 In addition, providers respond 
to relative payment rates by delivering 
more higher-profit services and fewer 
money-losing services.31 Both absolute and 
relative payment levels have implications 
for access to care as well as the cost and 
quality of that care. Medicaid fee-for-
service methods and levels influence 
access, quality, and costs and are central 
components of payment innovations. It is 
virtually impossible to implement or 
evaluate most payment reforms on a base 
of poorly constructed fee-for-service 
payments. New York’s experience is 
instructive. 
While states have significant latitude in 
the fundamentals of Medicaid rate setting, 
there are several areas where federal law 
authorizes or requires particular payment 
mechanisms. Among them are: 
 Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) 
Payments – Since 1981, federal law has 
required states to make additional 
payments for inpatient services to 
hospitals serving disproportionately large 
numbers of Medicaid and low-income, 
uninsured patients (DSH hospitals). 
States have considerable discretion in 
how they calculate and allocate DSH 
funds among hospitals. 33, 34 Notably, 
PPACA reduces states’ Medicaid DSH 
payments by $14.1 billion from 2014 to 
2019 with HHS to determine the 
methodology to effectuate the 
reduction.35, 36 
 
 Upper Payment Limit (UPL) – By 
regulation, state Medicaid programs may 
not pay classes of providers more in 
aggregate than they would have received 
under Medicare payment principles. To 
the extent that aggregate Medicaid 
payments to a class of providers are 
below the UPL, states are able to make 
lump sum payments to providers in that 
class.  
 
New York State Payment Reform 
In 2007, New York’s physician fee schedule was the second lowest in the country. Reimbursement rates to hospital clinics and 
community clinics had been frozen for more than a dozen years and clinics were paid on a per-visit basis — the same amount 
for every visit. The inpatient payment methodology was similarly flawed and Medicaid inpatient rates actually exceeded 
Medicaid inpatient costs, thereby incentivizing expensive inpatient care and no doubt contributing to New York’s last place 
ranking in a 50-state survey of avoidable hospital admissions.32 Before implementing a medical home initiative, New York had 
to rationalize its payment levels and payment methods or the provider community would be unable or unwilling to 
participate. Further, the State would be unable to evaluate the results. Over a three-year period, New York, with the support 
of consumers and primary care providers, moved almost $600 million from hospital inpatient rates to outpatient rates for 
hospital clinics, community clinics, and physicians. It also provided additional payments for physicians practicing in 
underserved areas and maintaining weekend and evening hours. New York replaced its per-visit payment method with 
Enhanced Ambulatory Patient Groups (EAPGs), a system that ties payment rates to patient complexity and the intensity of 
the services provided. The State also replaced its inpatient payment method with APR-DRGs, which likewise capture hospital 
resource and patient variation for the Medicaid population. With these basic, but essential, upgrades completed, New York 
was positioned to take on additional payment innovations including, requiring hospitals to provide present on admission 
information; declining payment for certain hospital-acquired conditions and “never events;” and implementing a medical 
home incentive and requiring data on outcomes so that the effectiveness of the medical home in improving quality and 
containing costs could be measured. 
While payment levels 
may not be the only 
determinant of whether 
a provider participates 
in Medicaid, it is 
certainly a key factor. 
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 Federally Qualified Health Center and 
Rural Health Clinic Payment Rates – 
Federal law establishes minimum facility-
specific Medicaid payment rates for 
Federally Qualified Health Centers 
(FQHCs) and Rural Health Clinics 
(RHCs). These rates are based on the 
facility’s costs and must be paid on a per-
visit basis unless the facility agrees to an 
alternative methodology that must 
generate at least as much revenue for the 
FQHC/ RHC as the per-visit 
methodology. 
 
 Actuarially Sound Capitation Rates – 
Since 2003, federal regulations have 
required that Medicaid payments under 
risk contracts and risk-sharing 
mechanisms be “actuarially sound.” 
 
In addition to those noted above, federal 
law also dictates Medicaid payment 
policies with respect to critical access 
hospitals and Indian Health Services. 
Much has been written on all of these 
provisions. The intent here is to simply flag 
areas where long-standing Medicaid 
policies can potentially advance or impede 
payment reform with respect to inpatient 
and outpatient payment policies. For 
example, there is no question that DSH 
and UPL are critical supplemental funding 
streams for safety net hospitals. However, 
at the same time, the amount and 
allocation methods of DSH and UPL tied 
to facility-specific costs and provided on a 
lump sum basis can distort payment 
reforms intended to incent care that is 
efficient and effective. Likewise, federal 
law requires states to pay FQHCs a cost-
based amount using a per-visit rate 
methodology. The challenge going forward 
will be to reconcile these mandates with 
efforts to bundle payments that more 
accurately capture the complexity of the 
services provided and to use payment 
incentives to reward quality and outcomes 
rather than volume.  
Payment Strategies to Improve 
Quality and Contain Costs  
An array of ideas for changing the way we 
pay for care is emerging, in many cases 
with Medicare taking the lead. All seek 
value by linking payment to efficiency and 
better patient outcomes. These payment 
strategies generally involve some form of 
bundled payment that builds on and 
aggregates fee-for-service payments. The 
following brief review of reform options 
demonstrates areas of opportunity for 
Medicaid. 
 Potentially Preventable Events (PPEs) 
– Health care costs can be controlled 
and quality improved by reducing 
unnecessary admissions, readmissions, 
complications, and emergency room 
visits. In 2007, CMS required that all 
Medicare claims include whether each 
complication diagnosis was present on 
admission (POA) in order to distinguish 
between complications that are hospital-
acquired and those developed prior to 
admission. In 2008, CMS barred 
additional payments for certain hospital-
acquired complications (HACs), 
including never events. Requiring POA 
information and reducing payment for 
HACs is intended to drive hospitals to 
take steps to minimize complications.37 
Some state Medicaid agencies have 
recently taken steps to reduce PPEs. A 
State Medicaid Director Letter in July 
2008 encouraged states to adopt similar 
policies with respect to their dual 
eligibles as well as their Medicaid-only 
patients.38 Maryland has taken the CMS 
approach further, expanding the list of 
HACs to a much larger set of potentially 
preventable complications.39 Extending 
this concept of “potentially preventable” 
to potentially preventable readmissions 
(PPRs) presents opportunities for more 
significant and more immediate cost 
savings combined with both quality 
improvement and movement toward 
episode-based payment.40 
 
An array of ideas for 
changing the way we 
pay for care is 
emerging – all seek 
value by linking 
payment to efficiency 
and better patient 
outcomes.  
   
 FFS with Bonus or Shared 
Savings/Patient-Centered Medical 
Home (PCMH) – While there is no one 
definition of the PCMH, core features 
include “physician-directed medical 
practice; a personal doctor for every 
patient; the capacity to coordinate high-
quality, accessible care; and payments 
that recognize a medical home’s added 
value for patients.”41 Payment policies 
generally provide FFS payments with 
add-ons for coordination and shared 
savings or bonuses for quality outcomes 
and reductions in emergency department 
and hospital utilization. Notably, 
payment incentives in the PCMH model 
remain grounded in FFS, demonstrating 
once again the importance of getting fee-
for-service payments right even as we 
move toward more effective payment 
models. 
 
 Bundled Payments/Episodes of Care – 
Bundled payments include all services 
associated with an episode of care such as 
an inpatient stay plus care required for a 
limited period of time post-discharge 
(e.g., 15 to 60 days). The payments to 
hospitals and physicians are combined 
into one patient severity adjusted 
amount that is shared among the 
providers. The idea is to create 
incentives for provider communication 
and coordination regarding the processes 
of care and their associated financial 
consequences.42 The challenge here is to 
define the services to be bundled, risk 
adjust the payment to reflect patient 
health status, and determine the 
recipient of the payment. 
 
 Global Payments/Accountable Care 
Organizations – Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) seek to provide 
financial incentives for cost containment 
and quality improvement across multiple 
sites of patient care under a global or 
capitated payment for all health care 
provided to each patient over a fixed 
period of time.43, 44 ACOs are entities or 
virtual entities that share responsibility 
for treating a group of patients. The 
capitated payment arrangement is 
directly with providers; there is no 
managed care organization or HMO 
between the purchaser and providers. 
Providers in an ACO are expected to 
coordinate care for their shared patients 
to enhance quality and efficiency. 
Providers in the ACO are held 
accountable for the care and outcomes of 
their patients and share in the savings 
generated through reductions in PPEs. 
 
These payment reforms are intended to 
link reimbursement to better outcomes, 
greater value, and improved patient 
experience. They may start with Medicare, 
and indeed most of the literature focuses 
on Medicare, but they will only be 
effective if they reflect the demographics of 
all populations and are embraced by all 
payers, including Medicaid. Providers 
simply cannot respond effectively to 
inconsistent payment signals.  
Among the issues all providers and payers 
must address are the lack of robust 
information on utilization and outcomes. 
Data must be collected and disseminated to 
identify opportunities and to measure 
successful efforts at cost savings and quality 
improvement. With information, 
interventions — such as care management, 
prior authorization requirements, or 
incentives to reduce PPRs — can be 
targeted to high-cost patients and over-
utilized services respectively; best practices 
can be identified; and return on 
investment can be documented.  
Early Medicaid Payment Reform 
Efforts 
States’ reliance on managed care models 
dates back to the 1990s and Medicaid 
remains a leader in using capitated 
payment models. Until recently the focus 
has been mostly “moms and kids” and the 
extent to which the care and cost 
incentives inherent in a capitated model 
flowed down to providers remains unclear. 
Many states now have the experience and 
the encounter data to hold plans 
accountable for the quality of care 
Payment reforms are 
intended to link 
reimbursement to 
better outcomes, 
greater value, and 
improved patient 
experience. 
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delivered to their enrollees and a number 
have initiated pay for performance 
programs with their managed care plans, 
albeit often focused on process not 
outcome measures. Given the breadth and 
depth of state experience with managed 
care, it would seem to be an opportune 
time to revisit carved-out of services (most 
notably behavioral health and certain 
long-term care services) and excluded 
populations (such as the seriously and 
persistently mentally ill) as well as 
extending managed care to dual eligibles. 
With strong performance requirements for 
care management and reducing 
unnecessary hospitalizations and 
institutionalizations, there is substantial 
potential for these organizations to 
improve quality and contain costs.  
Recognizing that five percent of the 
Medicaid beneficiaries drive 50 percent of 
the costs, states are especially focused on 
innovations for high-need, high-cost 
populations with multiple chronic 
conditions, often with underlying mental 
illness and/or substance abuse.45 Since 
2006, more than 30 state Medicaid 
programs have adopted medical home 
initiatives with some level of enhanced 
payments, shared savings, and/or bonus 
payments; a subset of them focus on 
patients with chronic illnesses and 
disabilities.46 However, only 11 states have 
embraced Medicare’s approach to hospital-
acquired conditions and never events.47 
The relatively small number is likely 
related to three factors: (1) state inpatient 
payment methodologies that are 
insufficiently granular to effectively 
capture the targeted complications; (2) 
claims systems that are not set up to 
capture POA data necessary for 
implementing a non-payment policy with 
respect to HACs/never events; and, (3) 
limited expertise and capacity that have 
been pushed to the edge by today’s fiscal 
environment. Finally, several states are 
considering payment policies related to 
potentially preventable events as a 
payment reform that can produce relatively 
quick savings while improving care. 
Payment and System Innovations 
Under National Health Reform 
PPACA establishes a new Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation with 
significant funding and a broad mandate to 
support pilot programs that develop, test 
and expand innovative payment and 
delivery arrangements in Medicare and 
Medicaid.48, 49 In addition, there are 
multiple demonstrations and payment 
initiatives targeted specifically to 
Medicaid, including higher payment rates 
for primary care; enhanced FMAP for 
health homes for chronically ill Medicaid 
beneficiaries; state demonstration programs 
for bundled payments and ACOs. 
Additional provisions bar state Medicaid 
programs from paying additional amounts 
for hospital-acquired conditions and 
authorize the integration of Medicare and 
Medicaid funding streams for dual eligible 
beneficiaries including options to do so via 
full risk or shared savings with state 
Medicaid agencies. These provisions roll 
out between 2010 and 2014. 
Creating a Stronger Foundation for 
Medicaid Payment Reform 
The goals of effective and sustainable 
Medicaid payment reform are to create a 
sound payment system that promotes 
access to care and incentivizes providers to 
adopt more effective and efficient delivery 
models, producing both immediate savings 
as well as long-term quality improvements. 
Medicaid’s success in achieving these goals 
will be enabled to the extent it can work 
with local consumers and providers. It will 
also be significantly influenced by the 
degree to which it aligns with Medicare 
and other payers in advancing 
complementary payment systems.50 
Conflicting incentives across payers dilute 
the effort of every payer to contain costs 
and improve quality. As the nation’s 
largest purchaser of care, Medicaid must 
take steps to ensure that its payment 
policies are sound and to the maximum 
extent possible align with Medicare and 
private payers. Indeed, as the dominant 
Medicaid’s success in 
achieving payment 
reform goals will be 
enabled to the extent it 
can work with local 
consumers and 
providers. 
   
payer for some services and in some 
markets, Medicaid can often lead payment 
and system reform efforts.  
Payment redesign presents significant 
opportunities and challenges for state and 
federal Medicaid officials and calls into 
question whether the 40-year-old division 
of responsibilities still makes sense today as 
Medicaid moves inexorably from welfare 
program to major health insurer. 
Moreover, as the federal deficit moves to 
center stage and the federal government 
assumes a greater role in financing 
Medicaid, it will have an even greater 
stake in the success of Medicaid’s payment 
policies and cost containment strategies. 
Although federal administrative resources 
are constrained, the capacity of state 
Medicaid agencies is arguably worse. States 
facing continued hiring freezes and staff 
furloughs barely have sufficient resources 
to maintain day-to-day operations much 
less to rethink and reform their payment 
policies and the claims systems that 
support them. If states were to try to 
individually reform their payment policies, 
they could spend months or even years 
explaining the changes to federal officials. 
For all these reasons, reconsideration of the 
respective roles of the federal and state 
government with respect to payment 
design may be warranted. 
Potential Ideas for a New 
Partnership 
Given the importance of payment methods 
in incentivizing providers to improve 
outcomes and reduce costs and the 
compelling evidence that some payment 
methods work better than others, CMS 
may want to provide support to states in 
crafting sound payment policies. States 
would benefit from development of 
national expertise on Medicaid payment 
systems at least comparable to what exists 
with respect to Medicare. Indeed, several 
states recently analyzed inpatient and 
outpatient payment methods and reached 
the same conclusions as to the most 
effective payment methods for generating 
accurate clinical data, assuring purchasing 
clarity, and advancing efficient and 
effective service use. One can readily 
envision a national effort to build on this 
knowledge base that would benefit both 
state officials seeking to implement sound 
Medicaid payment systems and CMS 
officials establishing payment reform 
metrics.  
Establishing sound payment levels is, in 
some ways, even more complicated and 
certainly more sensitive to individual state 
differences. Several commentators have 
proposed analytic frameworks to measure 
patient access to quality care and to 
establish appropriate payment levels across 
services and with respect to patient 
characteristics.51 With virtually unfettered 
discretion and little federal guidance, states 
are subject to the push and pull of budget 
pressures and politically powerful industry 
lobbies. Too often that means across-the-
board rate cuts or targeted add-ons to 
appease the most powerful stakeholders. 
With thoughtful discussion and clear 
delineation about roles, responsibilities, 
and incentives, more proactive CMS 
involvement informing Medicaid’s choice 
of rate-setting methods and payment levels 
could result in greater efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
Once states have reasonably sound fee-for-
service payment methods and levels, it will 
be easier to move to bundled or global 
payments or to craft primary care payment 
strategies that support patient centered 
medical homes as advanced by federal 
health reform legislation. Evidence-based 
payment reforms must be responsive to 
local markets and provider structures. 
Accordingly, here perhaps more than 
anywhere, states, working with their local 
consumers and providers, are positioned to 
lead. However, that does not preclude 
CMS from providing a common structure 
for states to use in designing their reforms, 
measuring outcome improvements and 
dollar savings, and guidance as to how and 
when states may share savings with 
providers and where states may integrate 
Medicaid and Medicare funding streams.  
States would benefit 
from development of 
national expertise on 
Medicaid payment 
systems that is at least 
comparable to what 
exists with respect to 
Medicare. 
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All states would benefit from clearer 
federal guidance and technical support 
with respect to Medicaid payment policies. 
For example, CMS could provide a 
framework to analyze payment methods or 
a list of payment principles along with a 
menu of specific methodological options 
noting the pros and cons of each. To the 
extent, CMS and its state partners develop 
a framework for making sound decisions 
about both absolute and relative payment 
amounts, it will be easier for states to make 
and defend payment decisions to state 
legislatures, in the State Plan Amendment 
(SPA) approval process and in court. 
Ultimately, both CMS and states will 
benefit from a partnership that relies more 
on states’ ability to understand and adopt 
sound Medicaid payment systems than on 
the their ability to demonstrate 
compliance with complicated UPL 
calculations and awkward crosswalks to 
Medicare models developed for a very 
different patient population. Finally, CMS 
could encourage and facilitate certain 
payment reforms through expedited or 
streamlined SPA review or enhanced 
match, as occurs in the PPACA with 
respect to health homes for chronically ill 
patients. This revitalized federal-state 
partnership would make better use of 
scarce administrative resources at both 
levels of government and ensure that 
Medicaid becomes a more effective 
purchaser of coverage, access and care, and 
a more influential player in national efforts 
to purchase value. 
This policy brief is 
made possible through 
support from the 
Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation. 
Conclusion 
Since its enactment in 1965, Medicaid has 
grown from an afterthought in the welfare 
system to the nation’s largest health 
insurer. In the process, it may have 
outgrown aspects of the original state-
federal partnership. In some areas, such as 
setting payment methodologies, a new 
relationship may be required; one that 
builds on the strengths of each partner and 
assures that scarce resources are used 
efficiently and effectively to advance 
health care reform. To succeed, that new 
partnership will ultimately need to include 
providers and consumers. As a pillar of the 
nation’s health care system, Medicaid has 
the responsibility and the power to 
influence the cost of care and the quality of 
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